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were associated with the incoming controller.
Because of multi coding, the 13 outgoing controller
OEs consisted of 21 marked SA items and the 11
incoming controller OEs consisted of 20 marked SA
items.
When the outgoing controller gave an
incomplete briefing or failed to use the checklist,
33% of the time it was associated with a lack of
detection, followed by a lack of comprehension
(33%), and a failure to project (33%). When the
outgoing controller did not use the briefed
information, 50 % of the time it was associated with a
failure to project followed by a lack of detection
(25%), and a lack of comprehension (25%).
Conclusions. Despite limitations of the study due to
missing data, the results suggest that both the
relieving controller and the one being relieved have
particular vulnerabilities at the time of the position
transfer. For OEs involving the controller being
relieved, all aspects of SA are equally involved. In
contrast, the relieving controller appears to be
especially vulnerable to inaccuracies due to a failure
of projecting the future traffic status. It would be
interesting to determine, under experimental
conditions, whether the relieving controller has more
difficulty than the relieved controller in
understanding the future ramifications of the current
traffic situation shortly following a transfer of
position.

Purpose
To address air traffic control (ATC) operational
errors (OEs) that occur early on position, past OE
reduction efforts focused on developing improved
position relief briefing checklists and analyzing the
content of the recorded verbal briefings. However,
the verbal briefing, by itself, does not ensure that
either the incoming or outgoing controller had an
accurate mental representation of the traffic situation.
If there are inaccuracies in either of their mental
representations, then the position relief process is
flawed. We examined an archival OE database to
determine whether en route OEs that occur as the
result of a problematic position transfer were due, in
part, to a flawed mental picture by either the
incoming or outgoing controller. The degradation of
the mental picture was analyzed using situation
awareness variables. Data Extraction. 455 en route
OEs were extracted from the Federal Aviation
Administration’s (FAA’s) OE database for the period
June 1, 2001 to June 1, 2004. These OEs were
marked in the data base as being associated with a
problematic position transfer.
Included in the
extraction were: a) three position relief briefing
(PRB) items (checklist not used, controller gave
incomplete briefing, and controller did not use
briefed information), (b) three Situation Awareness
(SA) items used to measure the mental representation
(did not detect, did not comprehend, and did not
project future traffic status), and c) final summary of
incident reports.
Results
Of the 455 position relief OEs, 318 were associated
with a lack of SA (70%). However, only 24 (8%)
were supported by additional information (i.e., the
marked PRB and SA items). For those 24 OEs, 13
were associated with the outgoing controller and 11
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THE INCIDENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT IN BRAZILIAN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
FROM 1997 TO 2002
Márcia Regina Molinari Barreto
Cintia Saba Fonseca
Brazilian Air Force Command, Aeronautical Institute of Psychology
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
The research on the incidence of psychological aspects of human factors in aircraft accidents, was developed by the
Aeronautical Institute of Psychology, aimed the identification of critical areas and the proposition of controlling
actions. The proposed actions approach ways to favour the development of attitudes and behaviours, aiming the
consolidation of a safety culture in the organizations. This work fills a great gap by making it possible to base the
preventive activities on data that reflect the Brazilian reality. The ergonomic approach, wich considers the accident
as a breakdown on the balance between individual, psychosocial and organizational conditionings of the man-taskmachine relationship, was used as support to group and analyse the data and identify critical areas. The date raised
in this research detaches the attitude and the decision making process as the most critical areas of the psychological
aspects in the occurence of the accidents. It can be observed that these areas are linked and directly influence the
flying activity in terms of the planning of the flight and capacity of judgment of the pilot, compromising, in this
way, the safe operation of the aircraft.
The presented data show the necessity of obtaining a
greater comprehension about the capacities and
human restrictions to apply and diffuse that
knowledge more thoroughly, so that it would be
possible to reduce the influence of human error in the
occurrence of the accidents.

Introduction
The greatest challenge of aviation has been to avoid
human error and control its incidence. Despite the
technological progress and high resources destined to
safety, which have made the rate of accidents in the
Brazilian aviation decline equaling to the countries
considered more advanced in the aeronautical world
scenery, the accidents are still occurring, bringing
incalculable material and human damages.

The research developed by the Aeronautical Institute
of Psychology about the incidence of the
psychological aspect in the occurrence of
aeronautical accidents in the civil aviation, in the
period from 1997 to 2002, is the continuity of a
previous work that studied the same segment, for the
period from 1992 to 1996, and it has the objective of
identifying the critical areas and propose measures to
make its control possible.

The flying activity has developed in a complex
social – technical system, where the human being,
with its characteristics of creativity and adaptability, f
occupy a prominent place in the operation of
aircrafts, elaboration of projects, production and
maintenance of equipments and administration of the
system. However, the existence of biological,
psychological and social limitations is part of the
human nature and can affect negatively people's
performance, invalidating the most sophisticated
methods and devices of prevention of accidents.

The study of the psychological aspect, in this
research, is based on the understanding of the human
performance as resulting from a series of factors:
internal and peculiar of human being and external,
situational, which condition the result of his/her
performance. In this work, the ergonomic approach
was used as theoretical base for collecting and
analyzing the data, by understanding the accident as a
rupture in the balance of the individual, psychosocial
and organizational conditionings, of the relationship
man-task-machine.

Human Factor’s studies show that the estimated
involvement of human error in the collapses in
technological systems that present risk in its
operation, such as: aviation, control room and nuclear
power stations, increased four times in the period
among the 60’s and 90”s, passing from 20% to 80%
(Reason et al., 1995). World statistics reveal that, the
technical crew is mentioned with more frequency
than the material failures. Researches in that area
indicate that among 70% to 80% of the aeronautical
accidents can be attributed, at least, partly, to human
error (Shappel and Wiegmann, 1996).

Methodology
The analyzed data refer to accidents happened in the
civil aviation, in the period from 1997 to 2002, in
which the psychological aspect was contributory. The
Table 1 presents the numbers of occurred accidents in
the cited period and the contribution of the
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psychological aspect, information obtained from the
Center of Investigation and Prevention of
Aeronautical Accidents (CENIPA), a sector of the
Air Force responsible for managing the System of
Prevention and Investigation of the Air Force
(SIPAER) in Brazil.

identify possible relationships between these factors
and the psychological ones.
Presentation of the Data
According to the collected data, it can be verified that
the contribution of the psychological aspect for the
occurrence of accidents concentrated mainly on five
areas, which are distributed in their respective
conditionings. In the individual conditioning, the
attitude and decision process stood out. In the
psychosocial conditioning, relationship in the work
environment and crew's dynamics were highlighted. At
last, in the organizational conditioning, the
organizational environment was the main area (Table 3).

Table 1: Contribution of the psychological aspect in the
period from 1997 to 2002.
Type of
Aviation
Civil

Total of
Accidents
377

Psychological
Aspect
184

The sample of the analyzed accidents was constituted
by 151 (82,0%) of the accidents occurred in the civil
aviation in which there was the contribution of the
psychological aspect.

Table 3: Areas of the psychological aspect that
contributed to the occurrence of accidents in the period
from 1997 to 2002.

The conditionings of the psychological aspect that
contributed to the accidents were extracted from the
final reports made by CENIPA. The frequency and
the percentage of each attribute/conditioning was
established in relation to the accidents/answers, as it
is illustrated in the Table 2.

Areas
Individual Conditionings
Attitude
Decision Process
Emotional state
Attention
Motivation
Professional experience
Personality
Perception
Memory
Motive response
Total of Answers
Psychosocial Conditionings
Relationship in the environment of
working
The crew's dynamics
Situations outside the environment of
working
Communication
Total of Answers
Organizational Conditionings
Environment organizational
Systems of Support
Total of Answers

Table 2: Conditionings of the psychological aspect in
the accidents in the period from 1997 to 2002.
Conditionings
f
%
Individual
465 79,8
Psychosocial
49 8,4
Organizational
69 11,8
Total of Answers 583 100,0

Because of the great number of extracted data, they
were divided in areas, as follows: the individual
conditioning (attitude, decision process, emotional
state, attention, motivation, professional experience,
personality, perception, memory and motive
response);
the
psychosocial
conditioning
(relationship in the work environment, the crew's
dynamics, situations outside the work atmosphere,
communication), and organizational conditioning
(organizational environment and system of support).
The frequency and percentage of the areas were
calculated based on the total of answers in each
conditioning of the psychological aspect.

F%

%

200
77
34
33
32
31
29
15
12
2
465

43,0
16,6
7,3
7,1
6,9
6,7
6,2
3,2
2,6
0,4
100

20

40,8

19
7

38,8
14,3

3
49

6,1
100

63
6
69

91,3
8,7
100,0

Regarding to the attitude area, it was observed that
the excess of self-confidence was the attribute that
most contributed to the occurrence of accidents in the
analyzed period (35,5%), followed by indulgence
(22,0%) and disregard with operations and
procedures (21,5%).
According to the area of decision making process, the
attributes wrong decision (62,3%) and deficient

Aiming a greater comprehension of the identified
areas, it was necessary to subdivide them in
attributes. So, the frequency and percentage of each
attribute in its respective area were also calculated.
The frequency and percentage of the contributory
operational factors were highlighted, in order to
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judgment (26,0%) were the ones that presented
larger incidence.

the system, provoking an immediate adverse effect.
The mistakes and violations can be related to the
environment where the task takes place or to the
physical and mental state of the operators that, in this
research, is revealed in the high incidence of
individual aspects.

In the area of working environment, the pressure of
the employer / superior (50,0%) and working group
culture (15,0%) were the attributes of larger
contribution. The crew's deficient integration (5,79%)
was the attribute of greater relevance in the area of
the crew's dynamics.

The active failures make it possible to identify the
latent failures related to decisions taken in the
managerial sphere, by people not directly involved in
the operation, which can stay occult for long periods.
The latent failures represent the fragility of the
defenses of the system, and they include, for
instance: inadequate training and supervision, bad
selective process, no standardization of procedures,
undeveloped safety culture, etc.

At last, it was observed that less developed
organizational culture (68,3%) was the attribute of
the organizational area that more significantly
contributed to the occurrence of accidents in the
civil aviation.
Regarding to the operational factor, deficient
judgment (15,7%), planning (14,0%) and supervision
(13,2%) were the aspects of greater incidence in the
referred period (Table 4).

In this sense, the high incidence of aspects related to
the individual area suggests that the organizational
defenses, which constitute the processes and practices
developed to minimize or to remove the risks
involved in the operation, are not accomplishing, in
an effective way the objective of reducing the
occurrence of errors in the activity. This supposition
is corroborated by the data related to the operational
factor, where the deficient supervision is verified as
the third aspect of greater incidence in the total of
occurred accidents.

Table 4: Contribution of the operational aspect in the
aeronautical accidents in the period of 1997 to 2002.
Operational aspects
Deficient judgment
Deficient planning
Deficient supervision
Indiscipline of flight
Uncertainty
Deficient application of commands
Adverse meteorological conditions
Deficient coordination cabin
Small flight experience or in the aircraft
Deficient instruction
Other aspects
Deficient maintenance
Influence of the environment
Deficient infrastructure
Operational aspects
Deficient judgment
Deficient control of air traffic
Total of Answers

f
127
113
107
84
81
57
40
37
34
33
30
27
13
11
9
4
1
808

%
15,7
14,0
13,2
10,4
10,0
7,1
5,0
4,6
4,2
4,1
3,7
3,3
1,6
1,4
1,1
0,5
0,1
100,0

The relationship among the individual, psychosocial
and organizational aspects will be better understood,
starting with comments related to the areas
and attributes of larger incidence that will be
presented next.
The concept of attitude is used to describe the
individual's tendency to answer in a certain way to
objects, people and situations.
For the prevention of accidents, it is fundamental to
known the personnel's attitudes regarding to his/her
work, the organization and safety activities, which
allows the elaboration of programs to strengthen
attitudes considered appropriate and modify those
that are unfavorable to a safe flight activity. The
excess of self-confidence, exhibitionism, indulgence,
improvisation and the disregard with operations and
procedures are attitudes considered incompatible with
flight safety.

Analysis of the Results
The analyzed period highlighted a great incidence of
individual contributors in comparison to the
psychosocial and organizational conditionings,
which, at first sight, show a less expressive
contribution to the occurrence of the accidents.
However, considering the most recent theories on
causality of the accidents, it can be verified that this
first impression is not confirmed.
Reason et al., (1995) classify as active failures the
errors and violations that happen in the operation of

The excess of self-confidence was the attribute that
most contributed to the occurrence of accidents in the
period and it refers to the exaggerated belief in the
own operational capacity. This belief can interfere in
the capacity of the pilot's judgment, through a
deficient critical analysis of the situation, in his
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process of decision making and in the planning of the
flight. In aviation, pilots with a lot of experience but
that don't live critical situations for a long period in
flight are supposed to develop this attitude. On the
other hand, the organizations that don't possess a
system of effective supervision and tolerate
incompatible attitudes with the safety of flight
activity reinforce the high self-confidence and other
attitudes that increase the risk of the operation. It is
supposed that the excess of self-confidence is related
to the aspects deficient judgment, supervision and
planning, that were the attributes of the operational
area that most contributed to the occurrence of
accidents in the analyzed period.

The mentioned internal and external aspects can
contribute to a deficient judgment of the flight
situation and, consequently, to a wrong decision
process, which was the attribute, of the area of
making decision process that presented larger
incidence.
The making decision process involves cognitive
(gathering and analysis of information), affective
(feelings that are mobilized by the situation) and
motors (actions undertaken after the choice of an
alternative) components, and it can suffer influences
of several orders. It is important that the procedures
adopted to improve the pilots' decisions not only
involve technical and operational aspects for routine
and non-routine situations, but also the application of
strategies to solve problems and emotional control.

The formation and maintenance of attitudes that favor
a safe flight can be obtained through training
programs, effective supervision activities and a flight
safety culture well developed.

It is important to point out that the performance in the
flight activity results not only from the individual
characteristics of the operator, in terms of
professional experience, motivation and personality,
among others. The characteristics of the group where
the individual is inserted and the rules, politics,
working conditions and culture of his/her
organization are also considered.

In the development of his/her activity, the pilot is
submitted to a great variety of incentives, which
should be selected in function of his/her relevance to
the situation in that he/ she is. This process is
fundamental to the elaboration of judgment, the
decision process and actions that should be implanted
during the flight (Bond et al., 1968).

In the current research, the less developed
organizational culture attribute was the one with
the highest evidence in the environmental
organizational area.

The process of decision, such as in routine or
emergency situations is also influenced by aspects
related to the individual characteristics of who
decides (self-confidence, emotional control, sleep,
fatigues, operational knowledge, experience) as well
as it suffers influences of external aspects provoked
by other people and the surrounding environment.

According to OACI - International Organization of
Civil Aviation, culture is defined as group of beliefs
and values shared by almost all the members of a
group. It defines values and predisposes to attitudes
and behavior, causing influences on the behavior of a
certain group.

The influence caused by third parties in the decision
process occurs, especially, when the other occupies a
leadership position, when the group strongly
influences the person who decides, or when there is
fear or concern related to the consequences of the
decision. This kind of influence can be observed in
the present research, in the attributes: pressure of the
employer/superior and culture of the working group,
of the psychosocial area.

Turner et al. (1989) state about culture of safety:
"scenery of beliefs, rules, attitudes, roles, technical
and social practices inside the organization, which
objective is to minimize the exposition of people to
conditions considered dangerous, inside or outside
the organization."

The surrounding environment influence the making
decision process, mainly if it contains elements
which mobilize stress such as: high level of noise,
risk level involved in the operation, excess of
information, innovation and complexity of the
situation, lack of elements of information and time.
In this sense, the crew's inadequate dynamics, in
terms of definition and division of tasks, as cited, can
favor this overloaded environment.

It can be verified that the attributes of the individual
and psychosocial conditionings (disregard with
operations
and
procedures,
indulgence,
improvisation, pressure of the employer/superior)
and deficient supervision, of the operational factor,
are indicative of the presence of a culture of
less developed safety culture silted in the
organizational environment.
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The maintenance and strengthening of a safety
culture is a complex and expensive process. It
involves actions directed towards the increasing of
the individual competences, not only in the
technical/operational/interpersonal sphere, but also in
relation to the improvement of the policies and
managerial practices and the compromising of the
high direction with the flight safety. According to
Coelho and Magalhães (2001), "a solid flight safety
culture has great probability of reducing to the
minimum the influence of personal or psychosocial
aspects because interfere in the attitude of the people
and groups towards the prevention of accidents."

other fields of knowledge, can contribute to produce
effective results in the field of accident prevention.
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